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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH
CASE NO. 8600
CALYIN GOULD,

Plaintiff and Appellant,
vs.
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE &
TELEGRAPH COMPANY, A Public Utility
Corporation,
Defendant and Respondent.

BR'IEF OF APPELLANT
Richard W. Brann
Attorney for Plaintiff & Appellant
406 Kiesel Bldg., Ogden, Utah
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiff-Appellant, hereinafter called Plaintiff,
commenced this action for damages on December 30,
1955, against Defendant-Appellee, hereinafter called Defendant, in the District Court for Weber County, Utah,
Plaintiff alleging, among other things, that Defendant
negligently omitted Plaintiff's name, business address and
telephone number from the "Yellow Pages" of Defendant's Ogden and Vicinity Telephone Directory. for 1956.
The case was tried to a jury and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant
for the sum of $2,000.00 past and prospective profits lost
by Plaintiff <T. 108). On October 5, 1956, the Honorable
Parley E. Norseth, District Judge, made and entered an
order setting the verdict of the jury aside and granting
judgment notwithstanding the verdict in favor of Plaintiff
for nominal damages only <R. 39, 43) in accordance with
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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Defendant's motion for a directed verdict for Plaintiff
for nominal damages <T. 82, 83). The Court would note
that Plaintiff refers herein to the transcript of evidence
as (T.) and the balance of the record as ( R) .
The facts in this case are simple and to a large extent undisputed except as to damages. The Plaintiff is
a duly qualified and practicing attorney residing at and
doing business in Ogden City, Utah <T. 46-47). The
Defendant is a public utility telephone corporation doing
business as such in the State of Utah <T. 16-17). On
May 1, 1955, Plaintiff opened an office in the Kiesel
Building, Ogden, Utah, and commenced the practice of
law (T. 47). During August, 1955, Plaintiff contracted
with Defendant for a "joint user" business telephone
service <T. 24, 51) which was installed by Defendant in
October, several weeks before issuance of the new telephone directory <T. 24, 51 Plaintiff's Exhibits A & B).
This contract for service included Plaintiff's entitlement
to a listing in the "Yellow Pages" of the 1956 Ogden &
Vicinity Telephone Directory under "Lawyers" of Plaintiff's name, business address and telephone number <T.
24, 25, 38, 55, 57). The correct information concerning
Plaintiff's name, business address and telephone number
were correctly transmitted to the Defendant <T. 26, 30,
57, 58) and the same were correctly set forth in the white
pages of the 1956 Ogden Directory· <T. 30, Plaintiff's
Exhibit F). Defendant admitted that it intended to properly list Plaintiff <T. 38) and Defendant gave no justifiable reason whatsoever for the omission <T. 39).
Summarizing the foregoing relatively undisputed
facts-which the jury necessarily found by its verdict2
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the Defendant negligently omitted Plaintiff's name, business address and telephone number from the "Yellow
Pages" of Defendant's Ogden Telephone Directory for
1956 contrary to Defendant's contract obligation with
Plaintiff. The facts relative to Plaintiff's damages resulting from such omission are the major issue on this
appeal. The facts in evidence relative to damages are not
disputed, but both Defendant and the trial court question their sufficiency to support the jury verdict for
Plaintiff of $2,000.00.
The Plaintiff's evidence of damages consisted of the
testimony of himself, three brother lawyers and declarations in the nature of admissions by Defendant:
(a) Ira A. Huggins, Attorney, testified to his custom of cutting the section "Lawyers" from the Yello\v
Pages of the Telephone Directory and of his invariable
reference to such clipping for the purpose of contacting
fellow lawyers <T. 6, 7 and 8). Mr. Huggins testified to
difficulties in contacting Plaintiff and of his temporary
assumption that Plaintiff was not practicing law in Ogden
because of such omission <T. 6 and 7).
(b) David S. Kunz, Attorney, whose testimony was
excluded from evidence (T. 9-12).
(c) Glen Adams, Attorney, testified that he also
customarily referred to his "Lawyers" clipping from the
Yellow Pages (T. 42) and that "several times," or more,
he referred to such eli pping for the purpose of referring
clients to Plaintiff, but because of the omission of Plaintiff's name, etc., from his clipping, Mr. Adams referred
the clients in question to other lawyers. <T. 42 and 43).
(d) The Plaintiff, Calvin Gould, testified to the
decrease in his "new business' income following the issuance of the 1956 Telephone Directory <T. 62-80 inclu-
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sive) and stated that, in his opinion, he lost $200.00 a
month gross fees by reason of non-listing in the "Yellow
Pages" <T. 72). Defendant's objection to this opinion evidence was not renewed nor stricken after its admission.
(e) Defendant admits that it extensively advertises
and encourages the public use of its Classified Directory
or Yellow Pages <R. 7-13 inclusive, T. 18).
(f) Defendant states, among other things, in its
1956 Ogden & Vicinity Directory that:
"Because it is so easy, 9 out of 10 people use the
Yellow Pages when looking for thousands of other
products or services. You can use it too, to learn who
in your city, handles a certain product that has been
recommended or which you have seen advertised
elsewhere." <Page I, Yellow Pages, Exhibit F, T. 31).
STATEMENT OF POINTS
Point I.
The trial court erred in setting aside the substantial
damage verdict of the jury for Plaintiff and entering its
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, in accordance with
Defendant's motion, in favor of Plaintiff for nominal
damages only, because the evidence in this cause was sufficient to support the verdict of the jury.
ARGUMENT
It is settled law that where the case was tried to the
jury and a verdict returned, this Court, in reviewing the
grant of a judgment non obstante veredicto, must consider
the evidence in the light most favorable to supporting the
verdict and the Plaintiff is entitled to the most favorable
view of conflicting-evidence. Seybold v. Union Pac. R. Co.,
121 Utah 61, 238 P. (2d) I 74; 5 C.J.S., Appeal and Error,
Sec. 1574 (b); Bancroft's Code Practice & Remedies, 10
year Supp., Sec. 1773. It is equally well settled that the
4
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trial court does not have power to grant a motion for
judgment n. o. v. unless it can say, as a matter of law,
that there is neither evidence nor reasonable inference
from evidence to sustain the verdict. 3 Bancroft's Code
Practice & Remedies, Sec. 1079 et seq.
Defendant's contract with Plaintiff to furnish Plaintiff, for compensation, a business telephone service is undisputed <T. 22, 23, 24, 52, Plaintiff's Exhibits A, B, CJ.
That said contract entitled Plaintiff to a listing under
"Lawyers" in the Yellow Pages of the 1956 Ogden Directory is also undisputed, whether regarded as express <T.
57, 58) or i~plied in contract <T. 24, 25, 38, 52) or implied by law Sec. 54-3-8, U. C. A., 1953; 86 C.J.S., Tel &
Tel., Sec. 265, 1956 Supp.; 52 Am. Jur., Tel. & Tel., Sec. 48,
Supp., Sec. 95; Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Texas State
Optical (Tex. Civ. App.) 253 S. W. (2d) 877.
It is believed that Defendant will agree that it may be
held liable for damages for the negligent omission of a
business subscriber's listing from its Yellow Pages. 86
C.J.S., Tel. & Tel., Sec. 265, 52 Am. Jur., Tel. & Tel., Sec.
48, Supp., 95; 3 Sherman & Redfield, Neg., Sec. 567; Sections 54-2-1 <28), 54-3-1,54-3-8, 54-7-22, U. C. A., 1953;
Annat. 68 A.L.R. 1325.
There is no issue in this case regarding whether Defendant limited its liability by contract or otherwise,
which Plaintiff concedes Defendant could do. See 175
A.L.R. 8, 41, Sec. 25. The Defendant, on stipulation,
struck its Third Defense of the complaint setting up a
tariff limitation of liability. Defendant's Yellow Pages, at
present, are not regulated by the Public Service Commis. .
sian.

5
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Anticipating Defendant's argument, raised in the
course of the trial, that the Yellow Pages of the directory
are not a public utility commodity, based on McTighe v.
New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 216 F. <2d) 26, Plaintiff respectfully refers the Court to the following cases
that hold directly or by implication that the Yellow Pages
are a public utility commodity that may be regulated by
the appropriate State public service commission, namely:
Calif. Fireproof & Storage Co. v. Brundige (Calif.) 248
Pac. 669, 47 A.L.R. 811; Riaboff vs. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co.,
<Calif.) 102 P. <2d) 465; Dist. of Columbia v. Chesapeake & Pot. Tel Co., 179 F. (2d) 814; Russell v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 130 F. Supp. 130; Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., v. Texas State Optical (Tex.) 253 S. W. (2d)
877 where the Court enjoined discrimination in the Yellow Pages; Sections 54-2-1 (28), 54-3-1, 54-3-8, 54-4-1,
U. C. A. 1953; see State v. Nelson, 65 Utah 457, 238 P.
237, where a business outside the scope of "public service"
is defined.
The point in issue on this appeal is whether or not
the evidence of Plaintiff's damages in this case was sufficient to go to the jury, or, in other words, whether the
evidence was sufficient to raise a question of fact as to the
extent of Plaintiff's damages. If there is no substantial
competent evidence in this case upon which the jury could
make a finding of Plqintiff's damages, then the Court
could have directed a verdict and it did properly enter its
judgement notwithstanding the verdict. Seybold v. Union
Pac. R. Co., 121 Utah 61, 239 P. (2d) 174. But, as previously noted, all the evidence must be considered in a light
most favorable to Plaintiff, Seybold v. Union Pac. R. Co.,
supra. If there is any substantial evidence in this case
upon which men of ordinary reason and fairness could
make a finding of Plaintiff's damages, then the trial court
6
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had no power to enter its judgement notwithstanding the
verdict and, on this appea1, this Court should reinstate
the jury verdict. Seybold v. Union Pac. R. Co., supra; 5
C.J.S., Appeal & Error, Sec. 1930; 9 Wigmore, 3ed., Sec.
2994; Barron & Holtzoff, Federal Practice & Procedure,
Sec. 1079.
,Plaintiff concedes that he must establish his monetary loss by some reasonable degree of proof, but it is submitted that the degree of proof required in this case is substantially less than that required in, for instance, an automobile damage case. Examples of text authorities on this
subject are as follows:
" ... the Plaintiff will not be denied a substantial
recovery if he has produced the best evidence available and it is sufficient to afford a reasonable basis
for estimating his loss." 15 Am. Jur., Damages, Sec.
23.
"In many cases, although, substantial damages are
established, their amount is, in so far as susceptible
of pecuniary admeasurement, either entirely uncertain or extremely difficult of ascertainment; in such
cases Plain tiff is not denied all rights of recovery, and
the amount is fixed by the Court or the jury in the
exercise of sound discretion under proper instructions
from the Court." 25 C.J .S. Damages, Section 28.
Ironically, but without apology, this writer argued
the converse side of this issue of certainty of proof as to
damages in the case of Hill v. Varner,- Utah-, 290
P. <2d) 448, wherein the trial court awarded the prevailing party nominal damages and this Court reversed the
trial Court, holding, among other things, that where the
fact of substantial damage is proved, the Court must make
an a\vard of substantial damages even though the extent

7
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of monetary loss is not proved with certainty. This Court
said in the Hill case, supra.,· quoting at length, that:
. "It is obvious that monetary loss because of injury
to a chattel is capable of more certain proof than is
the loss incurred because of a trespass to a water
right or elements involved in bodily injury, Plaintiff
should be held to that higher degree of proof. However, here we have an instance of substantial damage
proved but only nominal damages awarded, where
the general knowledge of the trier of the fact and all
men must indicate a loss beyond the mere invasion of
a legal right for which nominal damages are generally awarded. In all cases where damages are in dispute, the injured party is oftimes inclined to exaggerate his claim and the tortfeasor to minimize it, the
trier of the fact must resort to his own general knowledge of values in order to conclude the litigation. IX
Wigmore on Evidence, sec 2570. One of the the illustrations included in The Restatement of the Law of
Torts, sec. 912, supra, indicates that the rule of certainty should not be applied contrary to the dictates
of reason:
Illustration I, p. 578. "A intentionally kills B's
dog. No evidence is introduced as to the value
of the dog. B is entitled only to nominal damages, unless the description of the dog by witnesses is such as to indicate that it has some
substantial value."
"Although the amount of damages to be awarded
is a question of fact appellant has shown that he is
entitled to some compensatory damages." (Italics
ours.)
In the case at the bar, we are not dealing with a
damaged chattel capable of repair and capable of itemiza-

8
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tion as to cost of repair. We are here dealing with a living
economic organism, a business, that depends upon clients
for its continued existence. A lawyer cannot advertise, but
he can ethically be listed in certain publications which includes that of being listed in the Yellow Pages of the Telephone Directory together with his brother lawyers in the
area and without discrimination. A lawyer sells a service
and not a commodity such as a retail store might sell. A
lawyer's return from each client varies, depending on the
nature of the case, the nature of his contract with the
client, results obtained and a diversity of other factors. A
lawyer's expenses are pretty much a constant during any
one period and, therefore, the addition to or loss of income
is almost wholly profit, whether going to diminish overhead, or increase net profit. The addition of one satisfied
client may well, over a professional lifetime, multiply itself
many times over by referred satisfied clients. The gain or
loss of one contingent fee can very well make the difference to a young lawyer of continued practice or insurance
adjusting.
The Defendant admits that it extensively advertises
the use and benefits derived from the use of its Yellow
Pages (R. 7-13 inclusive, T. 18, p. I, Yellow Pages, Plaintiff's Exhibit F). Each of Plaintiff's attorney witnesses
testified that he customarily cut the appropriate "Lawyers" section from the periodic Yellow Pages and posted
such clipping for reference. Defendant claims the "9 out
of 10 people use the Yellow Pages when looking for thousands of other products or services" (P. I, Yellow Pages,
Exhibit f). The substantial monthly charges for advertising space in the Yellow Pages are well known.
In most, if not all, communities, the only complete
listing of lawyers offered to the general public is that of

9
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the Yellow Pages. Plaintiff's lawyer witnesses, Ira Huggins
and Glen Adams, both testified to their custom of cutting
the classified lawyer section from their directories and
posting them for reference (T. 6, 7, 8, 42) and both further testified to their assumption that Plaintiff was not
available when they found him completely omitted· from
their lists (T. 7, 42) . Both witnesses were personally acquainted with Plaintiff and brothers in the same comparatively small bar association, yet each assumed Plaintiff to
be unavailable. Ira Huggins also testified to the fact that
persons, other than lawyers, refer to the classified section
on lawyers <T. 8). The foregoing testimony certainly and
eloquently established the fact that Plaintiff was damaged
by the complete omission of his name, business address
and telephone number from the 1956 Ogden Classified
Directory.
A lawyer's clients come to him in many ways-established clients, express referrals, referrals by way of publicity and reputation, and chance clients-but there must
be an initial contact before the relationship is established
or problem posed. This writer respectfully submits that it
is a matter of common knowledge that the vast majority of
initial contacts are established by telephone and that such
initial contacts are instituted by the potential client over
the telephone. It is further submitted that the primary
source of information leading to such initial contacts is
found in the Yellow Pages of the local telephone directories.
Every client lost by Plaintiff by reason of his omission
from the Yellow Pages represented the loss of a legal fee
-be it great or little, a fee. Plaintiff testified to the decrease in his "new business" income following the issu-

10
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ance of the 1956 telephone directory and stated that, in
his opinion, he lost $200.00 a month gross fees by reason
of said omission (T. 62-80 inclusive).
That the Plaintiff lost "several" or more clients by
reason of his omission from the Yellow Pages is uncontradicted. Glen Adams, Esq., testified that several times" if I were to guess I tried three times"-he attempted to
refer clients to Plaintiff, but that he referred said clients
to other attorneys because of such omission of Plaintiff
from the Yellow Pages <T. 42, 43). The loss of any one
of these clients could well involve the loss of thousands of
dollars over the life of Plaintiff's legal career aD:d, as aforesaid, the loss at least involved a fee constituting substantial damages.
In closing, this writer cannot help but be disturbed
by the position of Defendant. Defendant, in substance,
tells the public and this Court that it can do as it pleases
in performance of its multi-million dollar monopoly endeavor, namely, production and sale of its Yellow Pages,
and that subscribers to space and listings in· the Yellow
Pages are helpless to hold Defendant to the ordinary
rules of liability for non-performance because of impossibility of proving damages. To say the Defendant cannot
discriminate and then to allow recovery of damages only
upon proof certain--otherwise relegating claimant to
nominal damages-is tantamount to opening the door
wide to discrimination in this type of case. Cognizant of
cases such as this at the bar, Restatement makes the following comment:
"Furthermore, , there are cases in which the experience of mankind is convincing that a substantial
pecuniary loss has occurred, while at the same time

II
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it is of such a character that the amount in money is
incapable of proof. In these cases, the Defendant
usually has reason to foresee this difficulty of proof
and should not be allowed to profit by it. In such
cases, it is reasonable to require a lesser degree of
certainty as to the amount of loss, leaving a greater
degree of discretion to the jury, subject to the usual
supervisory power of the Court." Restatement of the
Law, Contracts, Sec. 331.
CONCLUSION
There was sufficient, substantial, competent evidence
to support the verdict of the jury in the case at the bar
and, therefore, the verdict of the jury should be reinstated
in its entirety.
Respectfully submitted,
RICHARD W. BRANN

Attorney for Plaintiff & Appellant
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